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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Income Taxation—Capital Gains—Lump-Sum Distributions from Em-
ployees' Pension Plans—Separation from the Service in Corporate Re-
organizations—Victor S. Gittens. 1
 In 1961 the Ford Motor Company
acquired Philco Corporation. Ford liquidated Philco and re-incorporated
it in Delaware. Most employees of the old Philco continued in their same
jobs with the new Philco with duties similar to those under the old employer.
The old Philco had maintained a pension plan through a trust qualified under
Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. 2 In anticipation of the
acquisition by Ford, Philco amended the plan to allow lump-sum distribu-
tions to participating employees. The new provision allowed employees to
withdraw their accrued benefits under the plan as a lump-sum distribution
at the date of the acquisition by Ford, or to leave their share in the trust
until death or other separation from the service of the successor corporation.
After the acquisition by Ford and the reorganization, the new Philco adopted
the plan and notified each employee of his right to elect a lump-sum
distribution.
Gittens, a former employee of the old Philco, now working for the new
Philco, elected to receive the lump-sum distribution. On his income tax return
for the year 1962 he reported the distribution as a long term capital gain
pursuant to Section 402(a) (2) of the Code? The Commissioner reported
a deficiency contending that Gittens did not qualify under section 402(a) (2)
for capital gains treatment since he had not separated from the service as
required by that provision. Gittens then sought relief in the Tax Court.
HELD: Even though the cause of a distribution may relate back to a cor-
porate reorganization, there is no "separation from the service" within the
meaning of section 402 (a)(2) of the Code when a corporate liquidation
incident to a reorganization does not include a substantial change in the
make-up of employees.'
The importance of private pension programs cannot be overstated . 5
Congress, recognizing their value, has made pension and profit-sharing plans
the object of special grace in tax treatment. The present tax law encourages
the establishment of these plans by allowing employers a deduction for
1 49 T.C. 419 (1968).
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 [hereinafter referred to as the Code), 501(a).
3 Code § 402 (a) (2). This section provides:
Capital gains treatment for certain distributions,—In the case of an employees'
trust described in section 401(a), which is exempt from tax under section 501(a),
if the total distributions payable with respect to any employee are paid to the
distributee within 1 taxable year of the distributee on account of the employee's
death or other separation from the service, or on account of the death of the
employee after his separation from the service, the amount of such distribution,
to the extent exceeding the amounts contributed by the employee (determined
by applying section 72(f)), which employee contributions shall be reduced by
any amounts theretofore distributed to him which were not includable in gross
income, shall be considered a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset
held for more than 6 months....
4 Victor S. Gittens, 49 T.C. 419 (1968).
5 For a discussion of the importance of private pension and profit-sharing programs,
see Public Policy and Private Pension Programs, President's Committee on Corporate Pen-
sion Funds and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs (1965).
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contributions to pension or profit-sharing funds,° the trust itself being ex-
empted from taxation? For the avoidance of "income bunching," lump-sum
distributions to employees may be treated as long term capital gains in some
circumstances. 8
Capital gains treatment is permissible under section 402(a) (2) when
the following four conditions are met: 1) there has been a lump-sum distribu-
tion; 2) the distribution is made within a single taxable year; 3) there has
been a "separation from the service"; 4) and the distribution was made "on
account of" that separation from the service. There has been little problem
in determining whether there has been a lump-sum distribution or whether
that distribution was made within a single taxable year.° There are problems,
however, in determining whether a separation from the service has occurred,
and whether subsequent distributions are made "on account of that separa-
tion. These problems are particularly troublesome in the area of corporate
reorganizations.
All separations from the service involve changes in the employment
relationship. 1° Corporate reorganizations invariably effect changes in the
employment relationship, but the courts have formulated special rules to
determine which of these changes constitutes a "separation from the service"
under section 402 (a) (2). Furthermore, the complexity of many reorganizations
makes it difficult to establish the prerequisite causal relationship between a
separation from the service and the actual distribution. In Gittens, which
involved a corporate reorganization, the court established new rules for
determining when a separation from the service occurs and when that
separation is the cause of the distribution within the meaning of section
402(a)(2).
Separation from the service. The death of an employee' and his
retirement or discharge" are clear instances of changes in the employment
relationship which constitute a separation from the service. Not all changes
in the employment relationship constitute a separation from the service,
however. Promotion and transfer from one city to another are not included
within the meaning of separation from the service, although they are changes
in the employment relationship.'d
6 See Code § 404(a).
1 See Code § 501.
8 See Code § 402(a) (2). In addition, it is inherent in such plans that benefits repre-
sent a form of deferred compensation which will normally be paid to an employee after
retirement and therefore will be taxed at lower rates.
9 Cf. Beecher v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 547, 550 (ND. I11. 1963).
19 See United States v. Martin, 337 F.2d 171, 174 (8th Cir. 1964). See generally 4A
Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 25B.52 (1966).
11 See Code § 402(a) (2).
12 See Thomas E. Judkins, 31 T.C. 1022, 1027 (1959).
18 Estate of Frank B. Fry, 19 T.C. 461, 464 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 205 F.2d 517
(3d Cir. 1953), and Edward Joseph Glinske, Jr., 17 T.C. 562, 565 (1951), where separation
from the service was interpreted to mean separation from the service of the employer.
Many cases have been decided on this point. See United States v. Martin, 337 F.2d 171,
176 (8th Cir. 1964), and United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 943, 954 (5th Cir. 1964)
(where the identity of the corporate employer remained the same, but its beneficial
ownership changed) ; McGowan v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 364, 366 (E D. Wis. 1959),
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Early cases established that the change in the employment relationship
which occurs in . a corporate reorganization could constitute a separation
from the service. In Mary Miller, 14 a change in the beneficial ownership of
a corporation followed by the liquidation of the acquired corporation was
held to be a separation from the service, The employment relationship in
Miller was changed in that the employees no longer worked for their former
corporate employer but for its successor. A similar conclusion was reached
in Lester B. Martin 15 even though the acquired corporation was not liqui-
dated until some time after the acquisition effected a change in the beneficial
ownership." The Internal Revenue Service in a series of 1958 Revenue
Rulings conceded that a liquidation could constitute a separation from the
service even though the employees of the corporation continued to work in
similar jobs for the successor corporation.I 7
The rule developed in Miller could lead to incongruous results. For
example, if a subsidiary of Ford had acquired Philco, rather than Ford itself
as in Gittens, Ford might have decided not to liquidate Philco, but to
merge it with the acquiring subsidiary. If Philco were the company surviving
the merger there would be no "separation from the service" for its em-
ployees," but there would be a separation from the service for the employees
of the subsidiary corporation.'° On the other hand, if the subsidiary survived
the merger and Philco disappeared, there would be a separation from the
service, for Philco employees, because the identity of their corporate em-
ployer had changed when Philco was liquidated, but there would be no
separation from the service for the employees of the acquiring subsidiary. 2"
Obviously, there is little real difference in either situation since the employer's
ownership and operation would be the same no matter which corporate entity
Ford deemed most convenient to survive. In spite of such difficulties with this
rule, it was assumed that the basis of Miller was correct and that liquidation
of a corporation could constitute a separation from the service for its em-
affd, 277 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1960) ; William S. Bolden, 39 T. C. 829, 831-33 (1963) ; and
Harry K. Oliphint, 24 T.C. 744, 749 (1955) (where the employee continued to work in
some capacity for the corporate employer). See also Rev. Rul. 56-214, 1956-1 Cum.
Bull. 196.
14 22 T.C. 293 (1954), aff'd per curiam, 226 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1955), nonacquiescenee
in 1955-1 Cum. Bull. S acquiesced in, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 5. In Miller, the taxpayer was an
employee of a corporation which was acquired by another company. All employees were
transferred to the acquiring company. The former employer was liquidated and its pension
plan was terminated.
15 26 T.C. 100 (1950:acquiesced in, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 5.
le In Marlin, the taxpayer was employed by the subsidiary of another corporation.
All assets and all employees of the subsidiary were transferred to the parent corporation
and the subsidiary was liquidated. As in Miller, the former employer's plan was terminated
when the subsidiary was liquidated.
12 Compare Rev. Rul. 59-99, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 202 with Rev. Ruls. 58-94 through
58-98, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 194, 197, 200, 201, 202 and Rev. Rul. 58-383, 1958-2 Cum.
Bull. 147.
18 See United States v. Martin, 337 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1964). Cf. Rev. Rul. 58-99,
1958-1 Cum. Bull. 202.
le Cf. Lester B. Martin, 26 T.C. 100 (1956), acquiesced in 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 5; Rev.
Ruls. 58-94 through 58-98, supra note 17. But see United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 943,
951 (5th Or. 1964) (dictum).
2e Supra note 18.
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ployees even if they continued at very similar employment with the corpora-
tion's successor."
This assumption was challenged in United States v. Johnson:22 Although
that case was decided on another issue, the majority's analysis of the legis-
lative history of sections 402(a) (2) and 402(e) of the Code strongly indi-
cated that no corporate reorganization could constitute a separation from
the service unless it included a "substantial change in the make-up of
employees."23 Gittens used the dicta in Johnson and the legislative history
to which it referred as the grounds for its holding.
The majority in Gittens reasoned that the adoption of section 402 (e) by
Congress in 1954 and the legislative history of that section clearly indicated
a change in the law, and that Miller no longer provided a correct statement
of the instances in which a separation from the service occurred in a cor-
porate reorganization."
The court's examination of the legislative history of section 402 may be
summarized as follows: When the 1954 Code was being drafted, the Senate
feared that certain abuses might be possible under the Miller rule. When
the House bill appeared to continue the Miller rule in force, 25 the Senate
changed the bill to exclude from the meaning of separation from the service
all corporate reorganizations not including a substantial change in the make-
up of employees. 26 This exclusion by the Senate was finally incorporated in
the Act as evidenced by section 402(e) 27
 which limits application of the
Miller rule to 1954 only. The inclusion of the rule for 1954 was intended
to avoid hardship for those who might have relied on Miller, which had
been decided in the previous year.28
21 See Haggart v. Rockwood, 274 F. Supp. 817, 818 (D.N.D. 1967).
22 331 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1964). In Johnson, the taxpayer's employer was purchased
by the subsidiary of another company. The parent merged the subsidiary and the taxpayer's
employer. The taxpayer's employer was the surviving company and it remained a subsid-
iary of the parent company. The taxpayer's employer then terminated its pension plan
and distributions were made to employees at that time. The court held that there was no
separation from the service and that the distributions were made only on account of the
termination of the plan.
23 Id. at 947-49. But see Haggart v. Rockwood, 274 F. Supp. 817, 819-20 (D.N.D.
1967).
24 49 T.C. at 424-25.
25 See H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 3 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad.
News 4017, 4285-86 (1954).
26 See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 3 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad.
News 4621, 4685-86, 4928-29 (1954).
27 See H.R. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 3 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad.
News 5280, 5301-03 (1954). This is the Conference Committee report. Code § 402(e)
provides in pertinent parts:
Certain plan terminations—For purposes of subsection (a)(2), distributions
made after December 31, 1953, and before January 1, 1955, as the result of the
complete termination of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of an
employer which is a corporation, if the termination of the plan is incident to the
complete liquidation, occurring before the date of the enactment of this title, of
the corporation, . . shall be considered to be distributions made on account of
separation from service.
28 United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 943, 949 (5th Cir. 1964) ; S. Rep. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 3 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News, supra note 26, at 4685-86.
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The precise abuse which the Senate feared is not detailed either in the
legislative history of section 402 or in Gittens. Apparently, the Senate feared
that the owners of closely held corporations could easily deflect into a
qualified plan funds normally used for salaries or dividends. Periodically,
the corporation could be liquidated and the funds distributed in a lump sum.
The Senate feared that benefits thus gained would be taxed as long term
capital gains.23 It felt that benefits received in this way should be taxed
as ordinary income. 30
There was dispute in Gittens over how great a change the Senate had
made to prevent the abuses which it foresaw. The majority felt that the
Senate instituted a broad change in the meaning of separation from the
service and excluded all liquidations incident to reorganizations which did
not involve a substantial change in the make-up of employees.' A con-
curring judge felt that more narrow reform was intended by the Senate, and
that only the liquidation of closely held corporations need include substantial
changes in the make-up of employees in order to constitute separation from
the service.32
The interpretation suggested in the concurring opinion does have appeal,
but it is not convincing. It is appealing because it narrows the reform to
deal only with the threatening abuse without changing the tax treatment
accorded to less suspect liquidations. There is some support in the committee
reports for this view since the reports do not criticize all reorganizations, but
only reorganizations which might be arranged merely to take advantage of
the capital gains provision. 33 However, this interpretation, while plausible
on its face, fails upon a reading of section 402(e). Section 402(e) was
intended to include in the meaning of "separation from the service" for 1954
only those occasions which the Senate had decided to exclude from section
402(a) (2). If a more narrow revision of the definition of "separation from
the service" had been intended by the Congress, the language of 402(e)
would have been made correspondingly narrow. The broad language of
402(e) is unmistakable.
Although the rationale of the majority in Gittens is correct, its impact
is unfortunate. Congress has denied capital gains treatment to employees
who receive lump-sum distributions in most corporate reorganizations, even
though it continues to grant capital gains treatment to distributions made
under similar circumstances. Many corporate reorganizations necessitate the
distribution of pension benefits to participants in the plan. Typically, such
a need arises after the liquidating corporation has transferred all of its
employees and assets to the acquiring corporation. At this point the liqui-
dating corporation still has a pension trust to administer, and it may dis-
99 See Hearings on H.R. 8300 before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 572 (1954
39 See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 3 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad.
News, supra note 26.
31 49 T.C. at 425.
32 Id. at 428-29.
33 See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 3 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad.
News, supra note 26, at 4685.
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tribute the trust benefits in a lump sum simply to avoid overseeing the
administration of periodic payments.
"Income bunching" can have a substantial effect on the employee's
tax rate for the year in which he receives the distribution. It was precisely
this effect which Congress intended to eliminate by granting capital gains
treatment to lump-sum distributions in other situations:" It has not been
explained why all employees who receive lump-sum distributions because
of the liquidation of their employer during a reorganization which does not
include a substantial change in the make-up of employees should be denied
capital gains treatment while such relief is afforded to the employees of
corporations which liquidate under other circumstances. 35 Different treatment
for distributions made to employees of closed corporations can be justified
because a high potential for abuse exists in the reorganization of closed
corporations. Some beneficiaries of the pension plan of a closed corporation
may also be the owners of the corporation and, therefore, in a position to
force a sham reorganization. No adequate justification for Congress' decision
to deny capital gains treatment to employees who do not have such power
has yet been given. Congress need not have made its revision so broad if abuse
by closely held corporations was its only fear. In several areas, Congress closed
loopholes by narrowly defining closely held corporations and by specifying
different tax treatment for them 3 0
The solution chosen by Congress is particularly unfortunate since
the loophole which it was trying to close may not have existed at all. A
close scrutiny of the facts in Miller reveals a change in the beneficial owner-
ship of the corporation as well as a liquidation. Sham reorganizations of
closed corporations undertaken merely to obtain capital gains treatment
would only rarely involve a change in the beneficial ownership of the cor-
poration. A significant change in the ownership of a corporation would almost
always indicate that there had been some other reason for the reorganization.
If Miller was narrowly limited to its facts, no sham reorganizations could
meet its requirements and no loophole would exist. Furthermore, existing
Treasury regulations under the 1939 Code made it difficult to arrange sham
pension plans.87 This regulation alone probably would have sufficed to elim-
34 Cf. United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 943, 954 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Eckerman, The
Unrationalized Capital Gains Treatment of Lump-Sum Termination Distributions from
Qualified Pension, Profit-Sharing and Annuity Plans, 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 4 (1955).
35 A series of 1958 Revenue Rulings demonstrates that even the Internal Revenue
Service was willing to grant relief in situations where a lump-sum distribution was made
because of a corporate reorganization. See Rev. Ruls. 58-94 through 58-98, Rev. Rul.
58-383, supra note 17. And, in 1958, the Internal Revenue Service acquiesced in the Mary
Miller and Lester B. Martin decisions. See 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 5. It is difficult to understand
why the Internal Revenue Service later reversed its position and pressed for the result reached
in Gittens. It is clear from the Government's brief in Gittens, however, that the Government
did change its position. See Brief for the Respondent at 20-23, Victor S. Gittens, 49 T.C. 419
(1968).
36 E.g., Code § 1239 where capital gains treatment is denied for certain dealings
between a closed corporation and its controlling shareholder. Capital gains treatment is
allowed in similar transactions which do not involve closely held corporations. See Code
§ 1231.
37 See Reg. 111, Sec. 29.165-1, 3 Cal 1953 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 1[ 1150A. This
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Mate the abuse which Congress feared. The long-run effects of the Gittens de-
cision on "separation from the service" may be harmful to many employees
in the future, but the Gittens court merely enforced the law as it was written
by Congress. 38 If a change is to be made, Congress must make its°
Causation. When inquiring into causation, the courts have distinguished
two basic situations in corporate reorganizations: those in which a successor
corporation does not adopt the pension plan and those in which the succes-
sor does adopt the plan. Where there is no adoption of the plan by the successor
corporation, the courts have viewed distributions made to employees of the
liquidated corporation as having been made on account of their separation
from the service even if the employees transferred to the successor corpora-
tion.“) The transfer of employees to the successor corporation was apparently
considered to be a "mass" separation from the service of the liquidated cor-
poration which vested a right to the distribution in the separated employees.
In cases where the plan was adopted by the successor corporation, the
courts came to a different conclusion: 41
 The adoption of the plan was seen
as establishing a new employer-under-the-plan, and, therefore, only a separa-
tion from the service of that employer would occasion capital gains treat-
ment. Any separation from the service of the former employer was irrelevant.
If the successor corporation terminated the plan after its adoption, the courts
denied capital gains treatment to resulting distributions. Courts would often
ascribe their decisions to the fact that the distribution was made on account
of the termination of the plan, or whatever contemporaneous event appeared
to cause the distribution. 42 Although in such cases the courts constantly
speak of causation, it would appear that the real reason for the decisions
was the lack of separation from the service of the proper employer, the
present employer-under-the-plan. In spite of this apparent confusion of the
issues, courts were consistent in their result: capital gains treatment was
regulation requires, for example, that plans be permanent rather than temporary in nature
and it disqualifies plans which "amount to subterfuge for the distribution of profits to
shareholders." See also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), where the Court dis-
regarded a reorganization which was arranged solely for tax purposes.
38 A measure of relief is available to employees who receive lump-sum distributions
if they can qualify under Code §§ 1301-05 for "income averaging" relief. This relief is not
available to all, and it serves only to reduce, not to eliminate, the inequality of tax
treatment.
39 Some proposed changes require a different method for granting relief to recipients
of lump-sum distributions. Accrual of income, proration, income averaging and other
schemes have been suggested. See generally Eckerman, supra note 34. The President's
Committee on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Pro-
grams has recommended income averaging in place of the present capital gains device.
See Public Policy and Private Pension Programs, supra note 5, at 65. The Committee sug-
gested income averaging for reasons divorced from the problem mentioned above, but
enactment of such a device may well have the incidental merit of solving the difficulties
raised by section 402(a) (2).
19 See Mary Miller, 22 T.C. 293 (1954), nonacquiescence in 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 8,
acquiesced in, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 5; Lester B. Martin, 26 T.C. 100 (1956), acq. 1958-1
Cum. Bull. 5.
41 Rybacki v. Conley, 340 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955); Jack E. Schlegel, 46 T.C. 706
(1966) ; Clarence F. Buckley, 29 T.C. 455 (1957).
42 See EN. Funkhouser, 44 T.C. 178, 184-85, aff'd, 375 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1967),
where a request by the employee was considered the cause of the distribution.
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always denied if the successor corporation adopted the plan and later
terminated it.
The obvious shortcoming of this view is that an employee's separation
from his old employer may well have been the dominant cause of the dis-
tribution even though the plan had been adopted by the successor corporation.
Some recognition of this possibility came in Jack E. Settlege1.43 There, the
Tax Court indicated in dicta that separation from the service of the liqui-
dating corporation might be considered the cause of a distribution made by
its successor if the successor's adoption was made merely to provide a
"breathing spell" in which to effect the orderly termination of the plan.
Until Gittens, however, the courts never related any distribution back to a
cause which occurred prior to the adoption of the plan.
If the court in Gittens had not been willing to look back to the acquisi-
tion by Ford, it could have used the lack of a separation from the employer-
under-the-plan (the new Philco) to decide the case against Gittens. If the
court had followed the traditional rationale and found that the distribution
was not made on account of separation from the service of the correct
employer, it would most likely have held that the distribution was made
on account of the election by Gittens to receive the lump-sum distribution
because that election was the only contemporaneous event which could
explain the distribution.
In Gittens the court reasoned that since the distribution "related back"
to the reorganization and was causally connected with it, then the distribu-
tion was made "on account of" that reorganization. It pointed out that,
although the adoption by the new Philco was more than a breathing spell,
only a few weeks had elapsed between the liquidation of the old Philco and
the announcement of the employees' right to a lump-sum distribution by
the new Philco. That right had been secured for the employees by the old
Philco when the plan was amended in anticipation of the reorganization
with Ford.
It should be noted, however, that in some respects Gittens was an easy
case in which to ignore the adoption of the plan by the new Philco since
the employees' election privilege was announced only a few weeks after
the liquidation of the succeeded corporation. And, the only other cause
which the court might have found, the election of the lump-sum distribution
by Gittens, was itself created by the old Philco in anticipation of the im-
pending reorganization. The plan was not terminated by the new Philco
and, in fact, the new Philco was only remotely connected with the distribution
to Gittens. It was relatively easy, then, for the court to look back to the
old Philco to find the cause of the distribution.
Future cases may involve much more activity by the successor corpora-
tion than did Gittens, and it will be more difficult for a court to relate the
distribution back to the reorganization. For example, the activity of the
successor corporation will be much more important if the successor adopts
the plan and terminates it some time later. But the language in Gittens is
so broad that it appears likely that many post-adoption distributions—even
93 46 T.C. 706 (1966).
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plan terminations—could qualify as being causally connected with the reor-
ganization. If this is so, and if these reorganizations can qualify as separations
from the service under the new Gittens test, then capital gains relief will
be available. This new approach appears more rational than the older more
formal approach to causation, since it considers what Congress surely in-
tended that it consider: the actual cause for a distribution.
Conclusion: Even though Gittens has liberalized the test for determining
the cause of a distribution when the distribution is made after an adoption
by a successor corporation, it is clear that the net effect of the decision is
the drastic curtailment of capital gains relief for employees receiving lump-
sum distributions made in a reorganization situation. The new test rules out
capital gains relief in a great number of corporate reorganizations. Except
in reorganizations where a substantial change in the make-up of employees
occurs, capital gains treatment will be denied. With this restrictive view of
separation from the service, the liberal changes made by the case in the
area of causation have almost no practical effect. One may assume that cor-
porate reorganizations will only rarely produce section 402(a) (2) relief for
employees in the future.
Congress, in its anxiety to protect against possible abuses under section
402, apparently desired the result reached in Gittens. But such broad-brush
treatment is of doubtful wisdom. Gittens makes manifest the need for legis-
lative reappraisal of section 402(a) (2).
JOHN P. BIRMINGHAM, JR.
Antitrust—Summary Judgment—Discovery—First Nat'l Bank v. Cities
Service Co.'—On June 11, 1956, Gerald B. Waldron, hereinafter re-
ferred to as petitioner, instituted a private antitrust action under the Sherman
Act against seven large oil companies. 2 Petitioner had an agreement to
purchase oil from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which had
been organized to handle the nationalized oil holdings of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company? He was in turn negotiating to sell this oil to Cities Service
Co., one of the defendants. Petitioner accused Cities of joining in a conspiracy
already established by the six other defendant companies to boycott Iranian
oil. The purpose of the alleged boycott was to compel NIOC to return the
property to Anglo-Iranian.
Cities was in need of substantial amounts of crude oil and had long
desired an independent supplier in the Middle-East. 4 Petitioner's original
claim was that Cities could satisfy this need by purchasing from him the
oil which he commanded under his agreement with NIOC. However, accord-
ing to petitioner, as the result of a bribe from the other defendant corn-
1 391 U.S. 253 (1968). The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Thurgood
Marshall.
2 Id. at 259.
3 Id. at 259-60.
4 Id. at 275.
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